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Antitrust & Corruption: Overruling Noerr  
 
Tim Wu 
Columbia University  
 
 We live in a time when concerns about influence over the American political 
process by powerful private interests have reached an apogee, both on the left and the 
right.  Among the laws originally intended to fight excessive private influence over 
republican institutions were the antitrust laws, whose sponsors were concerned not just 
with monopoly, but also its influence over legislatures and politicians. While no one would 
claim that the antitrust laws were meant to be comprehensive anticorruption laws, there 
can be little question that they were passed with concerns about the political influence of 
powerful firms and industry cartels. 
 
 Since the 1960s, however, antitrust law’s scrutiny of corrupt and deceptive political 
practices has been sharply limited by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,1 which provides 
immunity to antitrust liability for conduct that can be described as political or legal 
advocacy. The doctrine was created through apparent First Amendment avoidance, based 
on the premise that the Sherman Act could not have been intended to interfere with a 
right to petition government.2 
 
 The Noerr decision, dating from 1961, was strained when it was decided and has 
not aged well. As an interpretation of the antitrust laws, it ignored Congressional concern 
with political mischief undertaken by conspiracy or monopoly.  Its legitimacy has always 
rested on avoidance of the First Amendment, and while Noerr itself may have legitimately 
reflected such avoidance, the subsequent growth of a Noerr immunity has blown past any 
First Amendment-driven defense of its existence.  For that reason, others have suggested 
a reformulation of the doctrine.3  The better answer is that, lacking constitutional or 
statutory foundation, Noerr should be overruled.  
 
 The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, and “to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances.” It therefore protects efforts to influence 
political debate as well as legitimate petitioning in the legislative, judicial or 
administrative processes.4 The First Amendment does not, however create a right to bribe 
                                               
1 The doctrine’s name comes from two cases that were decided close in time: E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
2 See Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 132 n.6. 
3 For critiques of the Noerr doctrine see, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Report, Enforcement Perspectives on 
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine (2006); Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 
55 Rutgers L. Rev. 965, 1011 (2003); Karen Roche, Deference or Destruction? Reining in the Noerr-Pennington and 
State Action Doctrines, 45 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1295, 1341 (2012); see also, Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundations of 
Noerr-Pennington and the Burden of Proving Sham Petitioning: The Historical-Constitutional Argument in Favor of 
A "Clear and Convincing" Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 681, 696 (1994). 
4 Not all authorities agree that lawsuits are “petitions”, see Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 403 
(2011) (J. Scalia, concurring and dissenting) (“I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected 
“Petition” quite doubtful.”); U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, 
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government officials, deceive agencies, file false statements, or abuse government process 
through repeated filings designed only to injure a competitor. Nonetheless, each of these 
activities has, in some courts at least, been granted immunity under the overgrown Noerr 
immunity.5  It is an extraconstitutional outlier ripe for reexamination.  
 
 The case for overruling Noerr is buttressed by the fact that, since its decision, 
Noerr’s theoretical foundations have weakened,6  and are “wobbly and moth-eaten.”7  
Written before the dawn of public choice theory or contemporary understanding of 
interest group influence, it relies on an exceptionally stylized model of politics that 
understates the potential for corruption and denial of majority will.   
 
Moreover, several decades of experience with a judge-made immunity have shown 
a pronounced tendency for doctrinal creep -- a well-known problem for doctrines 
anchored in avoidance (so-called “avoidance creep.”). 8   Constitutional avoidance, as 
Charlotte Garden argues, yields decisions that deliberately interpret the statute in a 
manner at odds with Congressional intent.  Subsequent decisions building on that 
interpretation can easily leave behind both Congressional intent and the original 
justifications for the original reason for the avoidance.9   The result is a free-floating 
doctrine, as with Noerr, that becomes untethered to either statutory goals or 
Constitutional principle.  
 
 Overruling Noerr would not make political petitioning illegal. It would, instead, 
require defendants to rely on the First Amendment when seeking to defend what would 
otherwise be conduct that is illegal under the antitrust laws. Doctrinally, this is to force 
courts to address whether conduct in question is actually an antitrust violation, and if, so 
whether it is protected by the First Amendment or not, drawing on an established 
jurisprudence for some of the problems presented in the Noerr context.  For example, 
while the First Amendment protects false statements in some contexts,10 it has never 
protected perjury, or the making of false statements to government agencies.11  It should 
take no great  leap of insight to conclude that the First Amendment might be the superior 
vehicle for adjudging a defendant’s First Amendment interests.12  
  
                                               
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”). 
5  See infra text and accompanying notes 36-54.  
6 As argued in Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 Hastings L.J. 905, 910 (1990). 
7 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996). 
8 See Charlotte Garden, Avoidance Creep, U. Penn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020). 
9 See id. 
10 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (reversing prosecution of man who lied about military medal). 
11 Id at 720 (dicta suggesting that criminalization of false statements to the government and perjury are constitutional); 
U.S. v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941) (false statements to government agencies). 
12  Another, perhaps minor advantage of overruling Noerr would be the better development of a petitioning 
jurisprudence.  As it stands, it is unclear whether various putative forms of petitioning government are actually 
protected by the First Amendment, and the existence of a Noerr immunity has served to obscure.  See Maggie 
Mckinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1131 (2016).  
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 Noerr could be overruled by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case.  It could 
also be overruled by Congress.  The legislature, of course, is not in a position to overrule 
the aspects of Noerr immunity that are anchored in the First Amendment.13 But Congress 
could do what this article calls for, namely, return the immunities granted political speech 
and petitioning to their Constitutional limits, while reaffirming the purposes of the 
antitrust laws. 
 
 Part I outlines where Noerr itself went wrong; Part II, details the problem of 
doctrinal creep; Part III argues that Noerr should be overruled; and Part IV details what 
a First Amendment replacement would look like. 
 
I. Where Noerr went wrong 
 
 The Noerr litigation arose out of a long-running battle over the 1930s through 
1950s between two natural competitors: the railroad and the trucking industry, whose 
mutual animosity was the stuff of legend. The railroads were the older of the two 
industries, and had already had many run-ins with the antitrust laws.14  By the 1930s the 
railroads began to suffer from the competitive inroads being made by the newer trucking 
industry.  In response, the railroads began a series of anti-truck campaigns to hold their 
market position by any means necessary. 
 
 The railroads began using a technique then relatively new to the business world: a 
public relations campaign piloted through front groups and promulgated through the 
mass media.  Among the front groups used were “the Empire State Transport League” the 
“Save Our Highways Clubs,” and the “New Jersey Tax Foundation.” 15  These groups 
portrayed truckers as villainous creatures whose driving of heavy vehicles destroyed 
bridges, fractured roads, and created other public dangers.  As the trial court found, the 
campaign was “made to appear as spontaneously expressed views of independent persons 
and civic groups when, in fact, it was largely prepared and produced by [a PR firm] and 
paid for by the railroads.”16 The court summarized the approach as a "deception of the 
public, manufacture of bogus sources of reference, [and] distortion of public sources of 
information.”17 The trial judge wrote that “I prefer to treat the whole procedure in its true 
light, which is the technique of the ‘Big Lie.’”18 
 
 If unseemly, however, the campaigns were unquestionably legislative campaigns.  
The railroads had clear, if anticompetitive, political goals: to lower the statutory weight 
limits that kept truckers out of heavy transport and to increase the taxes they paid. To 
that end, the front groups presented data (allegedly false, though we don’t know for sure) 
                                               
13 Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 
171 U.S. 505 (1898); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. Terminal R.R. 
Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).  
15 See Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1957). 
16 Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 130. 
17 Noerr Motor Freight, 155 F. Supp. at 799. 
18 Id. 
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that, they claimed, revealed the damage done by trucks to roads and bridges. The other 
main deception, at least as found by the district court, concerned the question of just 
whom was presenting the information.19 As suggested already, the complaints were made 
to seem as if they were from disinterested third parties, concerned citizens, when in fact, 
they were not.  
 
 As a First Amendment case, Noerr is not an easy one. The railroads have in their 
favor that they were associating to engage in political speech, to present information 
relevant to government, and ask for changes in the law.  As the Supreme Court put it “No 
one denies that the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law 
enforcement practices.”20  The core speech at issue, moreover, if not impartial, was of 
value, expressing, as it did, the view that the truckers damaged public roads.   More 
generally, as the Court held, a rule that would “disqualify people from taking a public 
position on matters in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the 
government of a valuable source of information.”21 
 
 The trickier part comes from the deception: the use of the front groups to deceive 
government as to the source of the information presented, and the allegation that some 
of the information provided was false. No one has ever suggested that bans on 
impersonation in an official context violate the First Amendment, and the crime of 
making false statements to government is routinely prosecuted.22  The First Amendment 
defense is particularly challenging if it is true that plaintiffs intentionally and maliciously 
submitted false information to achieve an anticompetitive result — fraud on the 
legislature — and therefore were like the applicant who submits false information to 
obtain a patent.23  But if Noerr was just a case of creating a false impression of public 
support, something which is certainly unethical but happens with distressing regularity 
in public discourse, the question remains difficult.  
 
 But leaving the First Amendment aside, what was the proper construction of the 
Sherman Act?  Imagine the same case without government as the target of the campaign.  
It seems implausible that the Sherman Act would grant an automatic immunity in a case 
where an industry conspires to exclude a competitor by manipulating a body with the 
power to determine the conditions of competition. An effort to hamstring a rival by 
rigging a process to set exclusionary standards was the kind of thing condemned in cases 
like Allied Tube and Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.24  It is the kind of thing meant 
                                               
19 Id. 
20 365 U.S. 144.  
21 Id at 139.  
22 For example, a lobbyist paid by foreign sources who lies about his funding will not find a defense in First 
Amendment doctrine when charged with a crime.  Lobbying regulation “does not seek to limit what lobbyists are 
allowed to say” and thus does “not violate freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Jahad Atieh, Foreign 
Agents: Updating Fara To Protect American Democracy, 31.4 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1051, 1072-73 n.123 (2010) (citing 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)). 
23 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).  
24Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Other cases finding deception to potentially violate the antitrust laws include United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding a violation of Section 2 where Microsoft deceived software 
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for a rule of reason analysis: as Justice Brandeis wrote in Chicago Board of Trade, the 
question would be whether the conduct is such that “promotes competition, or whether it 
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition….”25  Perhaps the railroads would 
have argued the weight-limits were competition enhancing in some way, yet it seems more 
likely that they were more of a bad-faith effort to exclude their competitors. 
 
But Noerr did involve bodies of government, and not a standard setting body. That 
could lead some to believe that the campaigns, even if deceptive, are still not the kind of 
thing that the Sherman Act or other antitrust laws were intended to have jurisdiction over.  
Yet even the quickest tour of the history of the passage of the Sherman, Clayton and FTC 
Acts reveals that this is a grossly mistaken view of what Congress was concerned with 
when it passed the antitrust laws.   
 
The famous editorial cartoons of the Standard Oil Octopus always have its tentacles 
encircling legislatures.26  More specifically, among the abuses of which companies like 
Standard Oil, and later, J.P. Morgan’s New Haven railroad were accused was the bribing 
of public officials to  disadvantage smaller competitors, or to wrongly grant monopolies.27  
The legislative history is replete with evidence of such concerns.28  As Robert Faulker 
                                               
developers into developing software that would only work with Microsoft’s operating system); In re Warfarin Sodium 
Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 396–97 (3d Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of a Section 2 claim based in part on a 
deceptive marketing campaign disparaging a competitor); Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 
904, 914–17 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal of a Section 2 claim based on letters sent to pharmacists disparaging 
a rival drug company); Int’l Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1257–58 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(affirming a finding of Section 1 and Section 2 violations based on a deceptive advertising campaign).  
25Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
26 Joseph Keppler, Next!, PUCK MAG. , Sept. 7 1904, at centerfold. 
27 See, e.g., Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the Petroleum Industry, Part I: Position of The Standard 
Oil Company In The Petroleum Industry 153 (1907) (“Standard [Oil] has interfered with the construction of 
independent pipe lines in various ways. Having once constructed its own line it has used its influence to prevent the 
passage of laws giving [other] pipe lines the right of eminent domain.”); LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS — A 
PROFESSION 294 (1914) (“[T]he powerful New Haven monopoly, by threat, bribe or other influence, stopped 
construction and secured the abandonment of the competitive project. The laws of Massachusetts and of Rhode Island 
were nullified; the will of the people of two supposedly sovereign States was defied; and there is no power of regulation 
now possessed by, or which can be conferred upon, any State railroad commission or the Interstate Commerce 
Commission which could prevent or redress such a wrong to the people.”); THURMAN WILLIAM VAN METRE, 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES  510 (1921) (“The interstate commerce commission in its report 
concerning the New Haven Railroad monopoly said to ‘achieve such monopoly meant the reckless and scandalous 
expenditure of money; it meant the attempt to control public opinion; corruption of government; the attempt to pervert 
the political and economical instinct of the people in insolent defiance of law.’”); see also Ida Tarbell’s expose which 
is credited for arousing the public fury that led to the eventual breakup of Standard Oil: IDA TARBELL, HISTORY OF 
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 167-171 (detailing how the first Interstate Commerce bill was “pigeon-holed” by 
“Standard’s friends”). Tarbell collected primary sources in her appendices which expressed similar complaints, id at 
387 (producers complaining that an “anti-discrimination” act that would require railroads transporting petroleum in 
Pennsylvania to charge equal rates was “killed in the [Pennsylvania] House by the familiar means employed by 
legislative agents in disposing of measures objectionable, but not debatable.”). 
28 See, e.g., 30 CONG. REC. 1701 (1897) (Remarks of Sen. Pettigrew on the topic of trusts and tariffs) (“It is for us to 
say whether we will stop the march of events in their course, and make this again a government of the people, by the 
people, and for the people, or allow the present to crystallize and thus continue to be what we now are-a government 
of the trusts, by the trusts, and for the trusts-a plutocracy of artificial persons, sustained by bribery.”); 30 CONG. REC. 
1785 (1897) (Remarks of Sen. Mills on the topic of trusts and tariffs) (“we are loading up our manufacturer not for 
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writes, “there is nothing on the face of the [Sherman] Act to suggest that the Fifty-first 
Congress wanted to exempt concerted, unethical and anti-competitive activity.”29  He 
adds that it would be strange to do so “on the ironic premise that the Act permits a 
business combination to destroy or do grievous harm to a competitor by applying large 
sums of money to deceive elected officials.”30   
 
The best reading of the Sherman and Clayton Act is that the framers had an 
overarching concern about monopoly influence over democratic institutions, but also a 
more specific concern with the obtaining or maintaining monopoly through corrupt 
means, and especially through bribery or fraud.31  For that reason, whether in pursuit of 
monopolization or the restraint of trade, corruption and fraud on the government ought 
to be understood as one form of prohibited conduct.   
 
If that’s so, it leads to the conclusion that Noerr must be understood as an exercise 
in constitutional avoidance, a conclusion many other scholars have also reached; or 
alternatively, that the deception wasn’t quite bad enough to amount to fraud on the 
legislature.32  That ambiguity is what makes the case frustrating, for despite Justice 
Black’s bold writing, the Noerr opinion, by inventing an immunity instead of resolving 
the question, took the easy way out.  
 
At this point we need briefly address an alternative view of Noerr that has nothing 
to do with the First Amendment but has shown up in Supreme Court opinions.  That view 
holds Noerr to be a necessary implication of Parker immunity (and therefore, potentially, 
independent of the First Amendment).  Parker stands for the proposition that state action 
is immune from antitrust scrutiny.33   Hence, if the federal government, or even the states, 
                                               
the benefit of the laboring man in this country, but in order to build up magnificent trusts to dominate the legislation 
of this country, as they are doing”); 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (Remarks of Sen. Sherman) (“If the concentrated 
powers of this combination are intrusted[sic] to a single man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of 
government.”); see also E. Benjamin Andrews, Trusts According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117, 150 
(1889) (explaining the contents of the 1888 House Committee on Manufactures Investigation into the Standard Oil 
Trust) (“Our sources show that the witchery of the Standard Oil interest has penetrated even the political world. For 
some years it influenced, not to say dominated, in at least one great State, the legislature, executive, and courts. Its 
wiles in that field, described with large detail in the records of the Congressional committee, render very clear the 
political menace resident in these stupendous aggregations of wealth.”). For a host of commentators, past and present, 
offering similar interpretations, see also HENRY LEE STAPLES, THE FALL OF A RAILROAD EMPIRE; BRANDEIS AND THE 
NEW HAVEN MERGER BATTLE, 197 (1947) (“Brandeis not only warned of the dangers in the creation of the New 
Haven monopoly; he saw its significance as part of a larger movement of economic concentration that was threatening 
the foundations of American democracy.”); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1219, 1227 (1988) (citing RICHARD HOFSTADER, THE AGE OF REFORM 229 (1955)) (“Economic might was seen 
to bring with it ominous political power. Into the midst of this system of diffused power and unorganized strength the 
great corporations and investment houses had now thrust themselves, gigantic units commanding vast resources and 
quite capable of buying up political support on a wholesale basis, just as they bought their other supplies.”). 
29 See Faulkner, supra note 3, 691. 
30 Id. 
31 Cf. Walker Process, 382 U.S. 172. 
32 Faulker, supra note 3; Roche, supra note 3; Lao, supra note 3; Minda, supra note 6.   It remains possible that the 
court’s implicit statutory finding was that the deception in this case didn’t quite go far enough to be considered an 
illegitimate effort to corrupt the legislature.  
33 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).  
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decide to establish a monopoly, that is nonetheless not a violation of the antitrust laws.  
That has led some — most notably Justice Scalia — to suggest that Noerr immunity is 
simply “a corollary to Parker” because as it is within the rights of government act 
anticompetitively, “the federal antitrust laws also do not regulate the conduct of private 
individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government.”34 
 
If superficially appealing, this logic evaporates on further inspection.   To pursue 
monopoly is not the same thing as to pursue it corruptly, but the view just described 
brushes over the difference.  As already discussed the framers of the Sherman Act 
considered the activity of corruptly seeking of a state-granted monopolies to be within the 
concerns of the law, especially through bribery, threats or deception. Even if government 
can override the antitrust laws, it does not necessarily follow that the courts need 
immunize efforts to obtain state action, especially if they should go beyond the normal 
protections for advocacy provided by the First Amendment.   
 
This conclusion is reinforced by examining immunities outside of the antitrust 
context there is no such blanket “corollary” to be found. The government, unlike a private 
citizen, has special immunities when it puts people to death or seizes property.  Yet those 
seeking to convince government to use those powers enjoy no special immunity to bribery 
laws, lobbying laws, or other criminal prohibitions. They have, instead, only the 
protections for political advocacy that come from the First Amendment.  The existence of 
a government power has, outside of antitrust, never been read as a license to pursue it 
using independently illegal means.  It all returns to question of what the First Amendment 
protects, which returns us to the case for overruling Noerr. 
 
These are conclusions that are further buttressed by the Court’s recognition of a 
sham exception in Noerr.35   Were Noerr meant to be the perfect mirror image of Parker, 
it might be thought that any purported effort to influence government, no matter how 
distasteful, might be thought to be immunized. But the sham exception better suggests 
First Amendment avoidance, because it tracks the well-known position that the First 
Amendment has limits, and does not protect everything that might plausibly be described 
as speech or petitioning.  The sham exception looks very much like a placeholder for the 
limits of the First Amendment.  Just like conduct falsely claiming to be speech is not 
protected by the First Amendment, anti-competitive activity falsely claiming to be 
political petitioning is not afforded undue protection.36  
 
Finally, the idea that Noerr was constitutional avoidance is buttressed by other 
cases finding fraud on the government to be actionable under the antitrust laws.  In 
Walker Process, a party was alleged to have intentionally lied to the patent office about 
the state of the “prior art” so as to obtain a patent.37   The Court declined to create any 
special immunity for such conduct, instead stating that “the enforcement of a patent 
                                               
34 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991). 
35 The political conduct is “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor.”Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 144. 
36 Id. at 140. 
37 382 U.S. 172. 
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procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided 
the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present.”38   That result impeaches any idea 
that the Sherman Act was not meant to reach efforts to defraud government for 
anticompetitive purpose. 
 
All this suggests that while constitutional avoidance may be appropriate in some 
cases, it was mistaken in Noerr, because Noerr was hardly a one-off.  It gave birth to a 
judge-made immunity,  and in the process left a critical matter undetermined: it would 
always be unclear whether a court, invoking Noerr, need rely on Constitutional avoidance 
to do so, and thereby conduct a First Amendment analysis; or whether it was free to just 
invoke Noerr as a free-floating immunity.  That would, in time, allow the immunity to 
expand  far beyond any constitutional or statutory mandate.  
 
A different way of stating the critique is this: Noerr does not give the courts the 
tools or mandate to address the competing values of the First Amendment and the 
Antitrust laws in the cases it addresses.  Unlike, say, the overlap between patent and 
antitrust, where the conflict is made explicit, it was instead buried by constitutional 
avoidance.   That burial would lead the courts to expand the immunity in directions 
entirely unrelated to First Amendment value, a matter to which we now turn. 
 
The Relationship between the First Amendment and Antitrust Laws 
 
The antitrust laws and the First Amendment have shared goals.  Both laws envision 
open societies and have their anchor in liberty.  Both take as their device the promotion 
of competition in actual or metaphorical markets.  And both have been justified as means 
for preventing abuses of power, whether by government or the monopolist.  There is even 
some similarity in their methods:   what is censorship if not the exclusion of a competitor 
from the marketplace of ideas?39    
 
As laws serving roughly the same ends with similar philosophies, it might seem 
unlikely that the laws might come into conflict. But the tension we’ve seen arises from the 
fact that, as Noerr and similar cases show, the Firest Amendment blesses conduct -- 
petitioning -- that can be used to obtain anti-competitive ends.    However, the First 
Amendment does not protect everything that might conceivably be called “speech,” 
suggesting it might be important to take a closer look at just what speech values are 
implicated in political influence campaigns.  
 
 Imagine that the coal industry were concerned with the rise of wind power, an 
obvious competitor.  It might react in more than one way.  First, the coal industry or its 
owners might distribute information  (here assumed to be factual) showing that wind 
power, in fact, creates its own waste problems or is more expensive than generally 
thought.  It might distribute information suggesting that coal is not actually as “dirty” as 
                                               
38 Id at 174. 
39 There are, to be sure, differences.   The First Amendment has an obsession with discrimination among speakers not 
shared by the antitrust law, with the partial exception of the unenforced sections of the Robinson-Patman Act.    It is 
also relatively indifferent to the questions of power and censorial effect, happy to punish anything done by a state 
actor, unlike the antitrust law, which often demands demonstrations of market power or monopoly power.  
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widely believed (“clean coal”).   And it might formally petition government with economic 
arguments for abandoning its subsidies of  wind power.    
 
These activities are all within the core of First Amendment protection. The 
strongest argument for their protection is that, by providing information to government 
and the public relevant to an important debate, they serve the process of democratic self-
government, 40  both through the formation of public opinion and the provision of 
information necessary to making important public decisions.   It is true that the volume 
of speech that the coal industry can afford might be said to give its speech an unfair 
advantage; yet as it stands, the First Amendment has stood for the premise that more is 
more in that context.41  
 
So much for a “clean” campaign of political influence that relies on the publication 
of factual information, correctly attributed.  What about when the campaign becomes 
increasingly deceptive, corrupt, and abusive?  The answer is that the First Amendment 
interests weaken until they, at some point, they disappear entirely.  This point is key to 
understanding the First Amendment / antitrust analysis and a point largely neglected by 
Noerr and its Supreme Court progeny: not all the techniques of political influence are 
“speech” or petitioning at all.  
 
The coal industry might, as in Noerr, use front groups who lie about their funding 
to present its criticism of wind power, thereby deceiving the public and government as to 
the source of the critiques.  It might, next, publish demonstrably false, or even defamatory 
information, such as the suggestion that wind turbines are highly harmful to human 
health (“wind power syndrome”).42    Finally, the coal industry might intentionally and 
maliciously present false information — say, false pricing information, or the defamation 
of individuals involved in wind — in its petitions to government.  It might file endless 
procedural challenges to block the approval of wind farms by local authorities.  Finally, it 
might give cash bribes to government officials in exchange for a local ban on wind power.  
Or it, at the extreme, hire thugs to sabotage wind turbines under the cover of darkness. 
 
As we run through these increasingly dirty advocacy campaigns, the First 
Amendment interests become progressively weaker to non-existent.  Laws that ban 
bribery, defamation, deception of government and sabotage have all survived First 
                                               
40 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Vincent Blasi, 
Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 1 (1990).  
41 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (J. Brandeis dissenting) (“[T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is 
good ones.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech 
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment[.]”); accord Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010).  
42 Jeffrey Ellenbogen et al., Wind Turbine Health Impact Study: Report of Independent Expert Panel January 2012 13 
(2012) (“There is insufficient evidence that the noise from wind turbines is directly […] causing health problems or 
disease.”) 
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Amendment challenges, either based on the strength of the government interest, or the 
idea that there really is no protected speech at issue, but merely conduct.43    
 
On the antitrust side of the ledger, the strength of the government’s interests would 
similarly seem to depend on the spectrum of deception through outright corruption.    
Despite occasional academic suggestions that the antitrust laws should be indifferent to 
anticompetitive intent or malicious conduct, the nature of the conduct matters, as 
evidenced both by case law condemning intentional monopolization,44  deception,45 and 
other tortious conduct, like fraud or sabotage.   
 
This short section cannot capture every conceivable type of advocacy campaign.   
But what is notably lacking in Noerr is any consideration of the relative strength of the 
First Amendment and antitrust interests.  And as we shall see, it has led the courts — 
especially district courts — to extend Noerr immunity beyond any justifiable boundary. 
 
II. Leaving behind the Constitution 
 
 If it might originally have been defended as an exercise in Constitutional 
avoidance, over the decades the Noerr doctrine has grown into its own creature, too 
unconnected and insensitive to the competing concerns of antitrust policy and the First 
Amendment.  At its worst, it has provided immunities to classes of conduct, like bribery, 
abuse of government process, and lying to government which it seems clear that the 
antitrust laws were meant to punish and for which there are no constitutional protections. 
 
The 1991 decision City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc did the most 
to make the doctrine insensitive to the competing concerns in this area.46  The jury, at 
trial, had found a corrupt conspiracy between the city of Columbia and a billboard 
company.  Despite the fact that the First Amendment does not generally protect 
conspiracies, Justice Scalia’s majority nonetheless held the conduct protected by Noerr.47  
The key doctrinal move in Omni was to limit Noerr’s sham exception — which, as we’ve 
seen can be understood as a proxy for the First Amendment’s limits.  The Court limited it 
to one category of sham, bad faith abuse of the political process, and declined to find any 
other possible exceptions, such as the “conspiracy” exception found by the court of 
appeals. Given that the sham exception can be understood as standing in for the limits of 
the First Amendment, Omni gave courts an open door to use Noerr to protect conduct 
that would not be protected by the First Amendment.     
 
                                               
43 United States v. Halloran, 821 F.3d 321, 340 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect 
bribery); United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (never suggesting that 18 U.S.C. §1001 which makes it a 
federal crime to knowingly lie to the government poses first amendment issues); see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 732 (“A baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the 
exercise of rights protected by the [NLRA is] not within the scope of First Amendment protection[.]”) 
44 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
45 Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34; Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Unocal), FTC Dkt. No. 9305, slip op. at 16 (2004); Walker 
Process, 382 U.S. 172. 
46 Omni Outdoor Advertising,  499 U.S. 380 (1991). 
47 Id. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3630610
Overruling Noerr 
 11 
Since that time, Noerr has, in lower courts, come to protect a range of conduct that 
would not be protected by the First Amendment, including not just conspiracy, but 
bribery, false statements to government, deceit, and even abuse of process—so long as 
some political objective can be claimed.  Over-broad Noerr immunity and an under-
inclusive sham exception made courts reluctant to recognize areas of clearly 
anticompetitive action that should not enjoy any constitutional protection. 
 
Consider the following example of how Noerr is invoked to immunize bribery.  In 
2001, a district court in Louisiana heard allegations that a riverboat company was bribing 
government officials so as to prevent competitors from obtaining a license to operate.48 
The court rejected the idea that “bribery, extortion and corruption” would “abrogate 
antitrust immunity.”49 It did so based on the premise that even corrupt and criminal 
activity is immune from antitrust scrutiny, under Omni, so long as the ultimate object is 
a favorable political outcome.50 
 
In another departure from First Amendment principle, some courts have also 
interpreted Noerr to protect the making of false statements to government.  For example, 
in a 2013 dispute between two asphalt firms, one alleged the other had lied to municipal 
governments about the relevant regulations so as to trick the governments into excluding 
rivals.48  When targeted in an antitrust suit the court upheld immunity,51 despite the 
analogy to obtaining a fraudulent patent condemned in Walker Process,52  evidence of 
effects on competition, and the fact the First Amendment, with rare exceptions, does not 
protect false statements made to government. 
 
Finally, there are courts that have, unaccountably, immunized conduct that is 
nearly impossible to describe as political speech or petitioning. Conduct that Noerr itself 
named as unprotected — the use of political process as an anticompetitive weapon (such 
as through repetitive, baseless filings). 53  Even when the goal of the filing is for “the 
principle purpose of harming [a] competitor,” courts have refused to consider the filing a 
                                               
48 See Astoria Entm't, Inc. v. Edwards, 159 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. La. 2001). 
49 Id. at 322 (finding Noerr immunity for defendant “even taking plaintiff's allegations as true . . .  that the defendants 
engaged in corrupt political lobbying.”).  In some cases, the courts have entangled Noerr immunity with Parker 
immunity, which insists the Sherman Act does “not apply to anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States ‘as an 
act of government.’” 317 U.S. 352. But as discussed above, that the government itself cannot be guilty of an antitrust 
violation, should not mean that successful private bribery of legislatures should immunize the private actors.  
50 “Liability for injuries caused by such state action is precluded even where it is alleged that a private party urging 
the action did so by bribery, deceit or other wrongful conduct that may have affected the decision-making process.” 
Armstrong Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 185 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) 
(holding that because injury resulted from state denial of certificate to plaintiff, the hospital and physicians were 
immune from antitrust liability despite bribery and deceit in certification process.); see also Sandy River Nursing Care 
v. Aetna Cas., 985 F.2d 1138, 1147 (1st Cir. 1993). 
48 See Asphalt Paving Sys. v. Asphalt Maint. Sols., LLC, No. 12-2370, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46017, at *17–18 
(E.D. Pa., Mar. 28, 2013) (stating that lying was irrelevant because there were technically other ways for 
municipalities to find the correct information to counterbalance the lies). 
51 Id. 
52 382 U.S. 172.  
53 See, e.g., California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (explicitly labeling “a 
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims” as an example of a sham.). 
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sham.54 Courts have protected series of filings that petitioners never expected to win on.55 
Similarly they have fully ignored distinction between standards for single and multiple 
filings and insisted on firm proof of “objective unreasonableness” for each action despite 
the obvious increased harm that comes from fielding many specious claims.56 
 
 Other examples of dubious extensions to Noerr include an immunity premised on 
the communication of a list of school accreditation to the state,57  private and secret 
meetings at a governor’s mansion,58 and even boycotting competitors.59 At the risk of 
stating the obvious, the First Amendment goals served by immunizing these forms of 
conduct is unclear at best. 
 
 It is worth pointing out that not every court has ignored the First Amendment 
foundations of the Noerr doctrine. 60   Courts have sometimes insisted on a First 
Amendment analysis prior to granting Noerr immunity.  For example, consider litigation 
from the early 2000s, centered on allegations that a drug manufacturer sought to delay 
the entry of competitive generic drugs by wrongly listing its patent in the FDA’s orange 
book. In rejecting a Noerr defense, the district court agreed with the FTC that the listing 
was not a petition protected by the First Amendment, and therefore not entitled to Noerr 
immunity.  It did so on the premise that, as the FTC argued, the FDA’s actions were 
ministerial, as opposed to discretionary:  there is no Noerr immunity when the 
“government does not perform any independent review of the validity of the statements, 
does not make or issue any intervening judgment and instead acts in direct reliance on 
the private party's representations.” 61  Similarly, the FTC, at least, believes that 
                                               
54 Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 317–318 (6th Cir. 1986). 
55 P.R. Tel. Co. v. San Juan Cable LLC, 874 F.3d 767, 772 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Of course the absence of any outright 
victory in so many forays similarly makes it quite clear that the likelihood of prevailing was not paramount in [the 
petitioner’s] calculus when deciding whether to petition. But the task here is to identify sham litigation, not probable 
winners.”) (holding that 24 petitions were not baseless and thus protected, despite finding petitioner did not expect to 
win). 
56 See id.; see also Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 200 (3d Cir. 2015) (“After 
all, if Noerr-Pennington immunity shields objectively reasonable actions when considered individually, it should 
continue to shield them when they are aggregated[.]”). 
57 Mass. Sch. of Law v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1029, 1038 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding Noerr applicable despite 
the fact that the ABA's current “petitioning conduct” involved merely the communication of its list of accredited 
schools to the states). 
58 Astoria Entm't, Inc. v. Edwards, 159 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. La. 2001) (finding Noerr immunity despite the fact that 
the “case involves activity completely extraneous to the lawmaking [and adjudicatory] process.” And instead involved 
“meetings between the various defendants…held in private at the Governor's mansion and not in a public 
atmosphere.”) 
59 VIBO Corp. v. Conway, 669 F.3d 675, 684 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Some courts have held that a competitor's conduct of 
boycotting constitutes protected petitioning intended to induce government action, so long as the boycotting is not for 
the purposes of contracting for higher prices and does not amount to direct marketplace injury.”) (citing Armstrong 
185 F.3d 157-60); Sandy River, 985 F.2d 1141-44; Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288, 296-
97 (8th Cir. 1978). 
60 See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983); Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain 
Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 
370 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
61 In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 370. 
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misrepresentative communications to government are not protected by the First 
Amendment, and also not protected by Noerr.62 
 
  This might be a fine approach if followed generally, but is not, and the very 
inconsistency strengthens the case for overruling Noerr.  While the approach of the cases 
just discussed is the better one, nothing obliges a court to follow this formula when 
deciding a case, and the Supreme Court itself has ignored it.63 Hence, until Noerr is 
overruled, the immunities that attach to speech and petition will remain a hodge-podge 
of immunity associated with First Amendment protections, that is purely judge-made, 
and inconsistent with the anti-corruption purposes of the Sherman Act. 
 
 III.  Reasons to Overrule Noerr 
 
The problem of Noerr’s expansion is hardly unrecognized by commentators.64 
Even Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, not generally understood as a manual for vigorous 
antitrust enforcement, suggested that Noerr had gone too far in its licensing of 
anticompetitive conduct.65 There have, over the years, been several prominent calls for 
courts to adjust or narrow the Noerr doctrine,66 including a study by the FTC in 2006,67 
but the calls for substantive reform have had influence only at the margins.68 
 
If it can be agreed that Noerr has gone beyond any defensible basis in the First 
Amendment, there are three good reasons to overrule it. The first and most obvious is the 
duty of the Courts to fulfill their duty to apply the Sherman Act and similar laws as 
Congress intended.  The text of the statute does not contain exceptions for seeking  
monopolization or restraint of trade through governmental means.  And as suggested 
earlier, the legislative history of the antitrust laws does not suggest a Congress that 
wanted to exempt bribery, deception or other abuses from antitrust scrutiny.69  Noerr has 
therefore prevented government from confronting some of the problems that the antitrust 
laws were meant to solve. 
 
The second reason to overrule Noerr is to ensure greater consistency in the courts. 
As it stands, some courts consider First Amendment limits when deciding Noerr cases; 
but others feel free to treat Noerr as a free floating doctrine that can be extended 
                                               
62 See Unocal, FTC Dkt. No. 9305, at 16 (opinion of the Commission). 
63 Prof'l Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
64 See David Mcgowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the 
First Amendment, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 293 (1994); Minda, supra note 6; Lao, supra note 3; FTC Staff Report, 
supra note 3 at 2 fn. 2 (“We treat here […] three varieties of conduct, frequently alleged to be Noerr protected, that 
the Commission has learned from experience are often used for anticompetitive ends.”). 
65 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 347 (1993). 
66 See Faulkner, supra note 3 681, 696 (1994); Roche, supra note 3, 1341; Lao, supra note 3, 1011; Lawrence D. 
Bradley, Noerr-Pennington Immunity from Antitrust Liability Under Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff 
Bureau, Inc.: Replacing the Sham Exception with A Constitutional Analysis, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1305, 1324 (1984). 
67 FTC Staff Report, supra note 3. 
68 The FTC made some progress on its advocacy of a ministerial exception to Noerr in In re Buspirone Antitrust 
Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 370. The FTC also brought a complaint against Viropharma for filing petitions and 
complaints in order to slow a generic of their product to market. However, the case was dismissed at summary 
judgement on non-Noerr grounds. FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F. 3d 147 (3rd Cir. 2019). 
69 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
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regardless of its basis in the First Amendment.  The current approach is a recipe for 
inconsistency and circuit splits.  
 
In part this is accomplished by breaking the analysis into its constituent parts, so 
that it becomes obvious whether any given ruling is statutory or constitutional.   One 
would ask, first, whether the conduct in question represents the kind of thing that 
Congress meant to prohibit in Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 or 7 of the 
Clayton Act, or Section 5 of the FTC Act.   Once that is done, the Court can then consider 
whether the conduct is, nonetheless, protected by the First Amendment, relying on 
established First Amendment doctrine.  Doing this would not allow  courts to mix the 
issues and consequently avoid analysis of either.  
 
The third reason is related: maintaining the coherence of the respective 
Constitutional and statutory doctrines.  Because Noerr does not clearly call for either, it 
has creates a pronounced danger of doctrinal creep.70  To the extent protected speech or 
petitioning under the First Amendment is implicated, the First Amendment’s own 
jurisprudence is best suited to provide an answer.   To the degree that hard statutory 
questions are presented — just when is anticompetitive bribery a violation of the FTC Act? 
— such questions should be answered, as opposed to brushed away with a citation to 
Noerr.  
 
An alternative to overruling Noerr is to demand that courts to consider the First 
Amendment in the course of applying Noerr immunity.  This is better than the current 
state of affairs, but has the problem of being too convoluted.  Take the bribery case just 
described.  It would require the court, in the midst of an antitrust analysis, to consider the 
scope of any Constitutional right to bribery, potentially to create a bribery exception (or 
expand the sham exception) and then return to the antitrust point.  It is simpler, as is the 
normal style, to assess whether the conduct in question violates the law, and if so, whether 
it is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment, and then, if so, whether the 
government’s interests outweigh the speech interests. 
 
The doctrine of stare decisis might be read to caution against overruling Noerr and 
restoring First Amendment analysis.  However, because our understandings of business 
and economics tend to evolve over time, if there is one area of federal law where stare 
decisis has held little weight, it has been antitrust.  Relying on such changed 
understandings over the last 30 years, the Supreme Court has overruled major opinions 
across the board, even opinions that once to set the rules of the road for commerce, such 
as the per se bans on retail price maintenance and vertical price fixing.71    
 
                                               
70 Cf. Charlotte Garden, Avoidance Creep, U. Penn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (Courts “should use avoidance only 
if its implementation would be at least minimally consistent with the doctrine’s stated rationale—a low standard that 
courts nonetheless currently fail to meet when they use avoidance to resolve as-applied challenges.”). 
71 Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John 
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)); Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (overruling 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967)); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) 
(overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)). 
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Here, the problem of the “moth-eaten” foundations of Noerr are important.   Noerr 
may not be entirely naive, but it was written before the dramatic increases in lobbying 
budgets that occurred in the 21st century, and a better understandings of the private 
influence on legislatures.72 In the same sense that changing economic understanding 
caused the courts to overrule some of its per se rules, similarly, the changing 
understandings of political influence have changed the circumstances under which 
Noerr’s viability should be understood. 
 
We can add to this, finally, that the usual reason for declining to overrule a case — 
longstanding reliance by parties — should not be a major factor in this case.  The reason 
is that the First Amendment would remain to protect core political activities; indeed 
political advocates are already constantly relying on the First Amendment.  What would 
be newly subject to antitrust liability is conduct like bribery, fraud or deception of 
government.  But it seems hard to imagine that parties can be said to have reasonably 
relied on Noerr to immunize conduct that is malum in se. 
 
The better approach, both in terms of fidelity to Congressional intent, and also to 
reduce the variation among lower courts, is to overrule Noerr, and ask defendants to rely 
on the First Amendment should they believe their speech or petitioning is constitutionally 
protected.   This overruling of Noerr could be accomplished by the Supreme Court.  But 
it could also be accomplished by Congress.  In the course of antitrust reform, Congress 
can specify that Noerr immunity, to the extent it is not based on the Constitution, is 
overruled.  If Congress wanted it could also, create particular exemptions for political 
organizing at the same time. 
 
 IV  The First Amendment as a Replacement for Noerr 
 
 In the absence of Noerr, the defendant who claims to be petitioning government 
or expressing political views would not be left helpless.  Instead, such a defendant would 
raise the First Amendment as a defense, as is typical in other areas of the law.73  This 
section considers, briefly, what such a defense might look like in practice. 
 
A defendant engaged in concerted anti-competitive activities that involve the 
government would defend itself by asserting that it is engaged in either political speech, 
petitioning, or both. Faced with such a defense, the main two questions before the court 
would be this:  was the defendant in fact engaged in speech or petitioning, or, instead, in 
some category of conduct, such as bribery, deception of an agency, abuse of process, or 
other such categories?   Second, if the defendant was engaged in protected speech or 
                                               
72 Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average 
Citizens, 12 Perspectives on Politics 564 (2014) (arguing that “that economic elites and organized groups representing 
business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-
based interest groups have little or no independent influence.”).  
73 Noerr, 155 F. Supp. 827,  rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (“The defendants' conduct is not within that broad expanse of 
conduct which is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. What the defendants have combined to do is 
something more than free speech; [...] freedom to assemble; [and freedom to petition]. They have engaged in a course 
of conduct designed to destroy the good will of a competitor in order to secure a monopoly[.]”); see also Bill Johnson's 
Restaurants, 461 U.S. 731 (comparable first amendment analysis in labor law).  
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expressive conduct, do the governments’ interests — understood as preventing 
monopolistic corruption of the political process —  outweigh those interests?  
 
As the first step suggests, an important doctrinal tool in a First Amendment 
defense of Noerr like conduct is the speech / conduct distinction.  The speech / conduct 
distinction is a familiar First Amendment trope most famously associated with Holmes’ 
example of shouting “fire” in a crowded theater.  As implied by that example, the Court 
has never taken everything that might, in some sense be called “speech” to be protected 
expression under the First Amendment.  Many so-called “speech acts,” such as true 
threats, criminal conspiracy, harmful lies and most procedural court filings are not 
granted protection as speech under the First Amendment.74  Hence, a defendant who 
claims that their conduct, otherwise illegal under the Sherman Act, is in fact protected 
speech, would need to demonstrate that what is claimed as speech enjoys protection at 
all.75 
 
Much anticompetitive speech would still be protected.  The railroad company that 
expresses its passionate support for climate change laws, knowing that such laws will 
disadvantage the trucking industry, is protected by the First Amendment.   In fact, even 
if the industry supports such measures because emission requirements might hurt its 
competitors would still be engaged in protected speech — the premise being that it is 
participating in the debate.  But a company that issues false statements in a government 
proceeding to hurt a competitor or competition is not  protected, as in the example of the 
oil company that lies about its patents to a state agency formulating a regulation,76 or the 
filing of false claims to the FDA to try and extend the life of a patent.77  That kind of claim 
could be decided by United States v. Gilliland,78 which affirmed that intentionally false 
declarations to the government are unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court held 
                                               
74 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (threats); N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 
U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (“[A] threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion[is] without the protection of 
the First Amendment.”); Aikens v. State of Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904) (“The most innocent and 
constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot, neither 
its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law.”); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 
U.S. 45, 55 (1982) (“Although agreements to engage in illegal conduct undoubtedly possess some element of 
association, the State may ban such illegal agreements without trenching on any right of association protected by the 
First Amendment. The fact that such an agreement necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or 
upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech.”)  Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563, (1980) (“Consequently, there can 
be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public 
about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to 
inform it[.]”); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. 731 (court filings); see also Eugene Volokh, The "Speech Integral 
to Criminal Conduct" Exception, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 981, 983 (2016).  
75 Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (“It rarely has been suggested that the 
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of 
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”) 
76 Unocal, FTC Dkt. No. 9305. 
77Cf. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 370. 
78 312 U.S. 86 (1941). 
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that it was legitimate to protect “agencies from the perversion which might result from 
the deceptive practices described”79 and prosecutions for such lies are now routine. 
 
A similar analysis obtains for bribery.  Bribery can be thought of as a form of 
expressive conduct, in the same way that the assassination of a political figure might be.    
But if the courts sometimes take a very narrow view of bribery, they have not been willing 
to afford a Constitutional defense to those convicted of bribery.80  
 
It is important to understand how this analysis would differ from the invoking of 
Noerr’s sham exception. As it stands, the sham exception has been limited by the Supreme 
Court to a form of conduct unprotected by the First Amendment (purely baseless abuse 
of process).  The court using existing First Amendment analysis would necessarily be 
forced to consider whether other forms of expressive conduct, like bribery or deceit, were 
protected or not.81   
 
Even if they are not engaged in protected speech, antitrust defendants might argue, 
alternatively, that they were engaged in petitioning, which is separately protected by the 
First Amendment.  But to invoke this defense, the defendant would have to demonstrate 
that what they were doing was actually petitioning.  As the FTC puts it, petitioning  is not 
“all activity involving communication with the government;” but is limited to a “request 
to a government decision maker to exercise its discretion to decide in a certain way.”82 
 
Consequently, the manufacturer who petitions the Commerce department for an 
exception to a steel tariff is protected by the Constitution.  (Many forms of lobbying would 
likely be protected as well; though strictly speaking the Court has yet to explicitly rule that 
lobbying amounts to protected petitioning. 83 )  But there are such a thing as a 
communication with government that is not a petition. 84   For example, purely ministerial 
or procedural filings, over which the government exercises no discretion, are not good 
                                               
79 Id. at 93. 
80 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (holding that the court has a legitimate interest in 
combating quid pro quo corruption); Halloran, 821 F.3d 340; United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606, 621 
(D.N.J. 2018) (“The Government alleges that Defendants engaged in a quid pro quo bribery scheme, not that either 
defendant violated campaign finance regulations. In other words, the charges in this case concern bribery, not political 
speech.”); United States v. McGregor, No. 10-186, 2011 WL 1576950, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2011) (“If at trial the 
Government can show that there was a bribery scheme to deprive the citizenry of honest services, then Defendants' 
conduct, not their speech, will have been regulated by the statute.”) (emphasis added); but see Eugene Temchenko, A 
First Amendment Right to Corrupt Your Politician, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 465 (2018) (arguing that McDonnell v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) may have created an inadvertent First Amendment right to bribery). 
81 In a few cases — say, the use of front groups, or dissemination of false information — the court may recognize the 
underlying conduct as protected speech and the antitrust laws as regulation targeted at the anti-competitive impact of 
the speech.  Whether such cases would be taken as content-neutral or not is hard to say in the abstract; but in any case 
they yield the challenge of balancing the interests of the government as expressed in the antitrust laws against their 
effects on speech.  The difficulty of such balancing was probably what led to Noerr in the first place.  But the most 
important insights of this piece are for the speech which obviously lacks First Amendment value. 
82 See FTC, supra note 3, at 16. 
83 See Mckinley, supra note 10. 
84In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 370. 
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faith efforts to persuade the government of anything.85    Similarly, the party who lies to 
the patent office in a patent application has indeed tried to influence government in their 
favor, but in a form that cannot be termed a legitimate petition.86     
 
The First Amendment protections afforded litigation would remain a slightly 
complex matter.   The Supreme Court has, under the First Amendment, protected the 
activities of lawyers, at least when “resorting to the courts to seek vindication of 
Constitutional Rights.”  The Court has also said that “the Petition Clause protects the right 
of individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established by the government for 
resolution of legal disputes.”87    That, and the protection granted litigation under existing 
Noerr doctrine, would tend to suggest a baseline of constitutional protection for suits that 
are allegedly filed for anticompetitive purposes.   That said, the Constitutional protection 
afforded litigation is obviously limited. Courts have long felt themselves free to punish 
lawyers who bring frivolous suits, lie to the court during litigation, or induce perjury.  
Hence, baseless or repetitive litigation brought purely for harassment purposes would be 
unprotected. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 Corruption of government and private gaming of regulatory process are broadly 
felt concerns.  In that context, the Noerr decision’s foundations look increasingly dubious. 
As efforts to narrow Noerr have not succeeded, the overruling of Noerr by the courts or 
Congress is an important step.  
 
 I do not deny (who could) the possibility that the First Amendment doctrine is 
capable of its own doctrinal creep.   But the problem with avoidance creep is that the 
underlying justifications of both the statute and the Constitution go unexamined, as the 
doctrine takes on a life of its own.   When First Amendment doctrine creeps, its 
consequences are broader.  For example, a decision immunizing false statements in 
agency proceedings under the First Amendment, even if in an antitrust case would 
necessarily have broader effects.  Under Noerr, such concerns can be isolated and ignored 
in the cloud of immunity that the doctrine has created.  And that is why, among other 
reasons, that Noerr should be overruled. 
                                               
85Id. 
86 See Walker Process, 382 U.S. 172. 
87 Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379; but see id, at 403 (J. Scalia dissenting) (“I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a 
constitutionally protected ‘Petition’ quite doubtful.”). 
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